The Solow condition is examined in an intertemporal model that blends the shirking and the turnover models of efficiency wages with managerial supervision. It is shown that the Solow condition does not hold when shirking and turnover costs are considered. The Solow condition can be a possible outcome when managerial productivity offsets shirking and turnover costs. JEL Classification: J50, J41, J63, J64
Introduction
Efficiency wage models have been developed to explain involuntary unemployment.
Firms may benefit from paying their workers more than the market clearing wage, thus generating involuntary unemployment. Among the efficiency wage models, the shirking and the turnover cost models are the most well known and cited. According to the shirking model (e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) , firms pay efficiency wages in order to reduce workers' shirking. High wages make the workers fear losing their jobs if they are caught shirking. In the turnover cost model (e.g. Salop, 1979) , workers who quit have to be replaced, which makes the firms incur search, recruitment and training costs. Firms have an incentive to minimize these costs and one mechanism for so doing is to set the wage at a level which discourages turnover.
One of the standard results of the efficiency wage models is due to Solow (1979) . The Solow condition, as it is known, states that an optimizing firm sets its wage at the level at which the elasticity of work effort with respect to the real wage is unity. However, this result has come under some criticism. As Akerlof and Yellen (1986) point out, an effort-wage elasticity of unity is quite high. If the elasticity is never that high, "then there cannot be an equilibrium with unemployment in an efficiency wage model." Akerlof and Yellen, 1986, p.14 As the Solow model does not contemplate shirking, workers who do not work hard do not waste the firm's output since additional workers can be hired. If additional costs related to low-effort labor are taken into consideration, this will result in an equilibrium effort-wage elasticity lower than unity.
On the other hand, efficiency wages have often been used to explain the pattern of interindustry wages (e.g. Krueger and Summers, 1988) . One empirical regularity that they sought to explain is that industries with greater productivity per employee pay their workers more (e.g. Katz and Summers, 1989) . Mehta (1998) proposed a model in which supervisors monitor and coordinate their subordinates. However managers are constrained to make tradeoffs in these activities. Therefore, "if the productivity of supervisors increases, then other things being equal, they will want to coordinate more and monitor less.
Consequently, to maintain effort, they will pay more. Similarly, an increase in the productivity of workers makes supervisors want to employ more of them. Other things being equal, they will now want to monitor each worker less and pay more." Mehta, 1998, p.153 This paper presents a model that combines the shirking and turnover costs models with managerial supervision in an intertemporal optimizing framework. The model encompasses the analyses of Marti (1997) and Mehta (1998) into an intertemporal optimization framework developed along the lines of Lin and Lai (1994) . The results reveal that when managerial productivity is not considered, and shirking and turnover costs are taken into account, the Solow condition is not valid. Furthermore, when managerial productivity is considered and offsets shirking and turnover costs, then the Solow condition can be a possible outcome.
The Model
Following Mehta (1998) , the representative firm has a production function that depends on the product of managers and workers:
The first term on the right hand side (RHS) of equation (1) It is implicitly assumed in the production function (1) that the probability of detecting shirking is equal to one. It is also assumed that the representative firm is a monopolistic competitor in the goods market. The firm chooses three variables to maximize the discounted profit over an infinite horizon. It uses the span of control (s), the number of hired workers (h) and the relative wage (w) as control variables in the problem below:
The term in the brackets in equation (2) is independent of the relative wage, we have a version of the turnover cost model (Marti, 1997) . When q, , and e are independent of the relative wage and S and c(N) are different from zero, we have a dynamic version of Mehta's (1998) model. Therefore, the above specification combines the shirking and the turnover cost models with the managerial supervision model in an intertemporal optimization framework. (1) into the Hamiltonian, the first order conditions of this problem are:
where p y dy dp . Consider the steady state: h n w q n ) ( 0 and by using (4) and (6) in (7) 
From equation (8), we can examine the Solow condition.
The Solow Condition
Consider first a model without managerial supervision (i.e. 0
As it is assumed that the number of hired workers, h, is positive, then 0 h and given that 0 w and 0 w q , it follows that the numerator is less than unity and the denominator is greater than unity in equation (9). Therefore the wage-elasticity of effort is less than unity: 
which is also less than unity.
As seen above, our optimization problem reduces to a shirking model when 0 w and 0 w q . Then, combining equations (10) and (11) 
Thus, as in Akerlof and Yellen (1986) , when shirking is taken into consideration, the effortwage elasticity is less than unity, and the Solow conditions does not hold. 
Condition (14) asserts that the Solow condition depends on the rate of productivity of managers and workers. The weak condition only requires that this rate must be positive. This result is quite appealing since managers are employed, among other things, to reduce shirking and turnover costs. Therefore, when managerial productivity is considered, it can offset the former effect of shirking and turnovers costs in order to guarantee that the Solow condition holds.
Concluding remarks
This paper blends the shirking and the turnover models of efficiency wages with managerial supervision in an intertemporal optimization framework. It is shown that the Solow condition does not hold when shirking and turnover costs are considered. However, the Solow condition can be a possible outcome when managerial productivity offsets shirking and turnover costs.
